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AMERICAN COURTS-MARTIAL FOR ENEMY WAR CRIMES 
Tara Leet 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the Persian Gulf War in 1991, nineteen American service-
men and two American servicewomen were taken prisoner by Iraq.} 
All suffered physical abuse. 2 They were beaten, urinated upon, and 
electrocuted.3 They sustained broken bones, perforated eardrums, 
and chipped teeth.4 One of the servicewomen was sexually molested.5 
During and preceding that conflict, it was widely reported that Kuwaiti 
prisoners and Iraqi civilian detainees were subjected to even worse 
treatment, including death by acid bath immersion, gang rapes in 
front of family members, and torture with electric drills. 6 Despite 
these acts, no trials based on any of those crimes were ever held. 7 No 
tribunals were convened by the United States or the United Nations.8 
In fact, no charges were ever filed in any international forum based on 
the Iraqi war crimes of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.9 
t Resident Fellow, Center for the Study of Professional Military Ethics, 
United States Naval Academy. My thanks to Scott Silliman, Director, 
Center for Law, Ethics, and National Security, Duke University School of 
Law, and LCDR Daniel P. Shanahan, JAGC, USN, for their helpful 
comments. 
1. Christopher Dickey & Donatella Lorch, Military justice: Saddam's Crimes, 





6. JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, SUMMARY OF REpORT 
ON IRAQI WAR CRIMES (DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM) (1992), at 8, at 
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/news/20030320/iraqicrimes.pdf [herein-
after SUMMARY OF REpORT ON IRAQI WAR CRIMES]. See also Louis Rene Beres, 
The War's True Measure; The Dosier of War Crimes Grow in Iraq, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 
6, 2003, at C1 (describing official reports of Iraqi war crimes committed 
against Kuwaiti civilians, including: torture by amputation of or injury to 
limbs, eyes, tongues, ears, noses, lips, and genitalii\; the use of electric drills 
and acid baths on victims; the repeated rape of women taken hostage; and 
numerous eyewitness accounts of Iraqis torturing women by making them 
eat their own flesh as it was cut from their bodies); Dickey & Lorch, supra 
note 1 (reporting that the final Pentagon report on Iraqi war crimes during 
the 1991 Persian Gulf War included "several linear feet of files"). 
7. Dickey & Lorch, supra note 1. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. There have been rare instances of domestic war crimes complaints aris-
ing in European countries with universal jurisdiction statutes. For example, 
charges based on Iraqi war crimes were filed by Danish authorities in No-
49 
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There have also been reports of potential war crimes during the 
recent war in Iraq. On March 23, 2003, members of the V.S. Army's 
507th Maintenance Company were captured near Al-Nasiriya, Iraq.lO 
That same day, Iraqi state television broadcasted images of five cap-
tured American soldiers being questioned by their captors. II V.S. offi-
cials, including Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld immediately 
responded by characterizing the broadcast as a violation of the Ge-
neva Conventions. I2 At one point during the conflict, American offi-
cials reported that a number of captured American soldiers may have 
been summarily executed in front of Iraqi townspeople. 13 At least one 
witness reported that an American prisoner was tortured during cap-
tivity.I4 Iraqi soldiers also committed other war crimes against coali-
tion troops and civilians, including the misuse of civilian clothes, 
white flags, hospitals, and mosques, and the use of human shields. IS 
vember of 2002, against Nizar al-Khazraji, a former head of the Iraqi armed 
forces. See Brendan Kileen, Denmark Seeks US Assurance Over Missing Iraqi 
General, IRISH TIMES, Apr. 5, 2003, at 11. Ai-Khazraji, a high-ranking mem-
ber of Saddam Hussein's regime who had defected, was living in Soro, 
outside of Copenhagen, when he was charged under Denmark's universal 
jurisdiction law with committing war crimes on Iraqi Kurds during the 
1980s. Id. Specifically, he was charged with violating Articles 146 and 147 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which deal with the protection of civil-
ians in time of war. Id. See also Denmark-Iraq: International justice for the Vic-
tims of Halabja, Nov. 22, 2002, at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/ 
denmark-iraqI1222002.html. A war-crimes-based complaint was also filed 
against Saddam Hussein in Belgium, under that country's broad universal 
jurisdiction legislation. See Glenn Frankel, Belgian War Crimes Law Undone fly 
Its Global Reach; Cases Against Political Figures Sparked Crises, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 30, 2003, at AI. But the chances of any country opening its courts to 
future war crimes controversies seem particularly diminished after 
Belgium's experience. See id. Some commentators suggest that Belgium's 
universal jurisdiction legislation, under which Rwandans were found guilty 
of war crimes and complaints were filed against Israeli and American offi-
cials, has now been effectively "gutted" as a result of diplomatic crises. Id. 
U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told reporters in Belgium "that he 
feared U.S. officials would not be able to visit the country for fear of being 
prosecuted and that the United States would withhold further funding for 
construction of a new NATO headquarters." Id. Rumsfeld further stated 
that "Belgium needs to recognize that there are consequences for its ac-
tions ... [i]t's perfectly possible to meet elsewhere." Id. 
10. Home at Last; jessica Lynch, Months After Being Injured in Iraq, Returns to West 
Virginia, CHI. TRIB., July 23, 2003, at 3. 
11. Phillip Coorey, TV Networks Refuse to Show Shocking Scenes, COURIER MAIL 
(Queensland, Australia), Mar. 25, 2003, at 4. 
12. Id. 
13. Eric Schmitt & David E. Sanger, A Nation at War: Washington; U.S. Officials 
Say Iraqis May Have Killed Some American PrisonersERROR! UNKNOWN SWITCH 
ARGUMENT., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2003, at B11. 
14. See Jerry Adler,jessica's Liberation, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 14,2003, at 42,46. 
15. See Mark Johnson et aI., 82nd Airborne Rings Paramilitaries; Commanders Un-
sure If Saddam Layalists Will Flee or Keep Fighting, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Apr. 
3, 2003, at 6A (quoting Defense Department spokeswoman Torie Clarke: 
"Iraqi troops are holed up in the mosque and firing at coalition forces .... 
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As this paper is written, it is still too early to sift through accounts 
from the recent conflict and definitively identify violations of interna-
tionallaw. 16 It is reasonable to assume, however, that some allegations 
of war crimes will be sustained. 
The intent to hold recent Iraqi war criminals accountable seemed 
clear in the spring of 2003. President Bush publicly warned Iraqi offi-
cials that they would be held accountable for war crimes committed 
during this conflict, and the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives entered concurrent resolutions calling for prosecution of 
Iraqi war crimes. 17 But a President's public vow to prosecute and a 
legislature's resolve to do so are not enough. As many have persua-
sively argued in the years since the 1991 Persian Gulf War, many iden-
tified and documented war crimes went entirely unprosecuted and 
unpunished after that war.18 Judicial forums must actually be con-
vened if there is to be any redress for enemy war crimes. Moreover, 
inaction now, in the face of flagrant violations of the laws of armed 
conflict, would effectively sanction a continuing course of illegal con-
duct. Others have addressed the need for war crimes trials adjudicat-
ing genocide-level offenses; I am here concerned with the need to 
adjudicate perfidy-level offenses, which almost inevitably result in in-
discriminate killing. 
Against all international laws of war, the regime's forces are using and abus-
ing the mosque as a military fortress"); Neil A. Lewis, A Nation at War: War 
Crimes; U.S. Is Preparing to Try Iraqis for Crimes Against Humanity and Mistreat-
ing Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2003, at B14 (reporting that Iraqi soldiers 
falsely waved flags of surrender, used "human shields, forced conscription, 
prevent[ed] the civilian population from fleeing, [fought] in civilian 
clothes and us[ed] protected zones like hospitals for cover"); Neal A. Rich-
ardson & Spencer J. Crona, Commentary, Make Iraqis Pay for Acts of 'Perfidy'; 
Disguising Soldiers as Civilians Is a War Crime That Must be Prosecuted, 
L.A.TIMES, Apr. 8, 2003, pt. 2, at 13 (reporting that "Fedayeen fighters 
waved a white flag and then opened fire on U.S. soldiers preparing to ac-
cept surrender," and describing an ambush "in which an ostensibly preg-
nant woman lured three American soldiers to their deaths by pretending to 
be in distress at a checkpoint and then detonating concealed explosives"). 
16. See, e.g., Mark Bowden, Ideas and Trends: War and Remembrance; Sometimes 
Heroism Is a Moving Target, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003, § 4, at 1 (describing 
the conflicting news reports regarding the circumstances of the March 23, 
2003 capture and rescue of Pfc. Jessica Lynch in Al-Nasiriya). 
17. President Bush warned, during a speech about Iraq in Cincinnati, Ohio on 
October 7, 2002, that "[a]ll war criminals will be pursued and punished." 
Saddam Hussein is a Threat to Peace, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2002, at A20. Sena-
tor Joe Biden, a Democrat from Delaware, Representative Curt Weldon, a 
Republican from Pennsylvania, and Senator Arlen Specter, a Republican 
from Pennsylvania, introduced concurrent Senate and House resolutions 
on April 8, 2003, calling for prompt prosecution of Iraqi government offi-
cials who directed or violated international laws of war. Tom Brune, Trial 
Plan Called a 'Mistake,' NEWS DAY, Apr. 9, 2003, at A33. 
18. See, e.g., James S. Robbins, War Crimes: The Case of Iraq, 18 FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF. 45 (1994). 
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We must act; the question is one of forum. Given the inevitable 
municipal disarray in a post-war society, legal action addressing war 
crime allegations is best pursued in two phases involving different fo-
rums. This paper proposes that when America commits its troops to 
fight wars on foreign lands, redress for war crimes should follow in 
two distinct steps. The first step must be to convene U.S. military 
courts-martial to prosecute mistreatment of American prisoners of war 
and violations of the laws of armed conflict committed against Ameri-
can troops. The second phase should involve tribunals convened and 
administered under the authority and direction of the new local gov-
ernment to address crimes that victimized civilians before and during 
the military conflict. 
Part II of this Article demonstrates that the United States Congress 
has, since at least 1916, legislatively authorized courts-martial jurisdic-
tion over foreign nationals accused of war crimes. Part III briefly de-
scribes some of the types of enemy actions that would constitute war 
crimes. Part IV illustrates that U.S. judicial curtailment of courts-mar-
tial jurisdiction has not eliminated the option of court-martialing for-
eign enemy war criminals. Finally, Part V argues that regular military 
courts-martial are a preferable option to specially-convened military 
commissions because they set a better due process benchmark for the 
forums that will follow. 
II. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORI1Y FOR COURTS-MARTIAL JU-
RISDICTION OVER INDIVlDUALS ACCUSED OF WAR 
CRIMES19 
A. History of the Legislative Grant of jurisdiction20 
The U.S. Constitution specifically grants to Congress: (1) the power 
to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and 
naval Forces";21 and (2) the power to "define and punish ... offenses 
19. See generally DOROTHY V. JONES, TOWARD A JUST WORLD (2002) (a compre-
hensive history of international military tribunals and war crimes trials); 
The Honorable Walter T. Cox III, The Army, the Courts, and the Constitution: 
the Evolution of Military Justice, 118 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1987) (focusing on the 
history of America's system of military justice and congressional involve-
ment in its development). 
20. For information regarding the legislative history of the Articles of War and 
the UCMJ, the author is particularly indebted to the scholarship of Major 
Jan E. Aldykiewicz, USA, and Major Geoffrey S. Corn, USA. The author's 
summary of the legislative history of court-martial jursidiction over enemy 
combatants is drawn from Part IV, and notes 28-73, of their article, and 
from William Winthrop's 1920 text, Military Law and Precedents. See Major 
Jan E. Aldykiewicz & Major Geoffrey S. Corn, Authority to Court-Martial Non-
U.S. Military Personnel for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed During Internal Armed Conflicts, 167 MIL. L. REv. 74,91-101 (2001); 
WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw AND PRECEDENTS 778-98 (2d ed. 1920). 
21. U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, c1. 14. 
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against the Law of Nations."22 Congress originally exercised these 
powers through the statutory enactment of numerous military codes, 
known as the Articles of War, the earliest of which date back to the 
American Revolution.23 Then, in 1950, recognizing the need for a 
single codified system of military law, separate from the criminal jus-
tice systems of the various states and of the Article III federal courts, 
Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") to 
replace the Articles of War. 24 Thus, the first grants of jurisdiction rel-
evant to this discussion can be gleaned from the various congressio-
nally-enacted Articles of War, and the current status of jurisdiction 
must be derived from the UCMJ. 
Congress authorized specific military jurisdiction over certain 
crimes unique to time of war-such as aiding the enemy and spying-
as early as 1775.25 The original statutory Code of Articles of War, en-
acted in that year, provided at Article 27 that" [w] hosoever relieves 
the enemy with money, victuals, or ammunition, or knowingly harbors 
or protects an enemy ... " and at Article 28 that "[w]hosoever holds 
correspondence with, or gives intelligence to, the enemy, either di-
rectly or indirectly ... " shall each "suffer death, or such other punish-
ment as a court-martial may direct."26 
The question of whether persons other than American soldiers can 
be tried at courts-martial for time-of-war offenses is hardly a new issue. 
Eighteenth and nineteenth-century legal scholars reviewing the above 
language from the 1775 Articles debated that very question.27 They 
noted that, unlike other Articles, 27 and 28 began with an unqualified 
"whosoever" rather than a qualified "whosoever serving in the conti-
nental army" and concluded that Articles 27 and 28 included civilians 
within their jurisdiction.28 
In addition to the jurisdiction over certain limited offenses such as 
aiding the enemy and spying, a clear, broader legislative grant of 
courts-martial jurisdiction over all individuals, civilian and military, 
who have committed war crimes first appeared in the 1916 Articles of 









Id. cl. 10. 
See WINTHROP, supra note 20, at 21-22. 
Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169,64 Stat. 107, 107-08 (1950). The UCMJ is cur-
rently codified as Chapter 47 of Title 10 ("Armed Forces") of the United 
States Code. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941 (2000). 
See WINTHROP, supra note 20, at 629 (indicating that Articles of War pro-
scribing aiding and communicating with the enemy first appeared in 1775). 
See id. at 102. 
See id. 
See id. (discussing Articles 27 and 28 of the 1775 Code: "Whether the word 
'whosoever' is here employed in a general sense, and includes civil equally 
with military persons, is a question frequently discussed in cases arising dur-
ing the late war, but which must be regarded as determined by the weight 
of reason and authority in the affirmative"). 
Articles of War of 1916, ch. 418, § 3, art. 12,39 Stat. 619, 652 (1917). 
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"General courts-martial shall have power to try any person subject to 
military law for any crime or offense made punishable by these articles 
and any other person who by the law of war is subject to trial by mili-
tary tribunals."30 
Prior to 1916, all previous Articles of War had limited courts-martial 
jurisdiction to a particular class of persons-persons otherwise subject 
to the code, or active duty military personnel and spies-or to only 
certain types of offensesY Notably, other provisions of the 1916 Arti-
cles of War did retain language from earlier versions of the statute 
limiting their jurisdiction to events occuring "in time of war."32 Arti-
cle 12 of the 1916 Articles, however, contained none of those limita-
tions.33 Article 12 of the 1916 Articles of War was clearly written to 
provide for courts-martial of war criminals, both enemy and 
American.34 
Article 12 was amended slightly in 1920, but the key language, 
quoted above, which granted courts-martial jurisdiction over two cate-
gories of people, those "subject to military law ... and . .. any other 
person who by the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunals,"35 
remained unchanged.36 In 1946, the U.S. Supreme Court, in In re 
Yamashita,37 acknowledged that Congress, through the Articles of 
War, had expressly sanctioned military law jurisdiction over enemy 
combatants for war crimes, via military commission or courts-mar-
tia1.38 While affirming the post-WWII military tribunal convictions of 
Japanese General Yamashita for violations of the law of war, the Court 
explicitly described the various kinds of courts-martial jurisdiction as 
follows: 
Article 2 includes among those persons subject to the Arti-
cles of War the personnel of our own military establishment. 
But this, as Article 12 indicates, does not exclude from the 
class of persons subject to trial by military commissions "any 
other person who by the law of war is subject to trial by mili-
tary tribunals," and who, under Article 12, may be tried b~ 
court-martial, or under Article 15 by military commission.3 
30. Id. (emphasis added). 
31. Aldykiewicz & Corn, supra note 20, at 92-94; Articles of War of 1916, ch. 
418, § 3, art. 12,39 Stat. 619, 652 (1917). 
32. Aldykiewicz & Corn, supra note 20, at 94-95. 
33. Articles of War of 1916, ch. 418, § 3, art. 12,39 Stat. 619, 652 (1917). 
34. Id. 
35. Articles of War of 1920, ch. 227, art. 12,41 Stat. 759, 789 (1921) (emphasis 
added). 
36. Aldykiewicz & Corn, supra note 20, at 96. 
37. 327 U.S. 1 (1946). 
38. !d. at 7. 
39. Id. General Yamashita was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death by 
hanging based on charges specifying that he had failed to control the mem-
bers of his command and had permitted them to commit "brutal atrocities 
and other high crimes." Id. at 5, 13-14. The Supreme Court upheld mili-
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When the UCMJ was enacted in 1950, essentially codifying "military 
law" as previously set forth in the Articles of War, the language of Arti-
cle 12 became UCMJ Article 18.40 UCMJ Article 18 was amended in 
1956 and again in 1968.41 The reference to persons subject to "mili-
tary law" became a reference to persons subject to the UCMJ,42 but 
Article 18 always retained the jurisdictional provision incorporating 
persons not otherwise subject to jurisdiction, and the current version 
of Article 18 is identical to the version passed in 1968.43 Article 18 
states that, in addition to jurisdiction over U.S. servicemembers regu-
larly subject to the UCMJ: "General courts-martial also have jurisdic-
tion to try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a 
military tribunal44 and may adjudge any punishment permitted by the 
law of war .... "45 Thus, from 1916 to the present, Congress has ex-
pressly extended courts-martial jurisdiction to cover any persons, in-
cluding civilian foreign nationals or enemy soldiers, who have 
committed war crimes.46 
tary commission jurisdiction over Yamashita, finding that Yamashita's com-
mission "was in complete conformity to the Act of Congress sanctioning the 
creation of such tribunals for the trial of offenses against the law of war 
committed by enemy combatants." Id. at II. 
40. Aldykiewicz & Corn, supra note 20, at 96. Section 818 comprises Article 18 
of the UCMJ. 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2000). 
41. Aldykiewicz & Com, supra note 20, at 97. 
42. Aldykiewicz & Com, supra note 20, at 97; see also id. at 80 n.l0 (discussing 
the term "persons subject to the code"). The critical point is that "foreign 
nationals and U.S. citizens not listed in UCMJ Article 2(a)(I) through 
2(a)(12) are not subject to the [UCMJ] and therefore are not subject to 
general courts-martial under the first sentence of UCMJ Article 18." Id. 
43. See id. at 96-97. 
44. Vast attention and scholarship in the last two years has been devoted to the 
point that enemy combatant war criminals qualify as persons who by the law 
of war are subject to the jurisdiction of military tribunals. See, e.g., Christo-
pher M. Evans, Note, Terrorism on Trial: The President's Constitutional Authority 
to Order the Prosecution of Suspected Terrorists fly Military Commission, 51 DUKE 
LJ. 1831 (2002); Lisa M. Ivey, Comment, Ready, Aim, Fire? The President's 
E-Xecutive Order Authorizing Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-citi-
zens in the War Against Terrorism Is a Powerful Weapon, But Should it be Upheld?, 
33 CUMBo L. REv. 107 (2002); Amanda Schaffer, Comment, Life, Liberty, and 
the Pursuit of Terrorists: An In-depth Analysis of the Government's Right to Classify 
United States Citizens Suspected of Terrorism as Enemy Combatants and Try Those 
Enemy Combatants fly Military Commission, 30 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1465 (2003). 
Moreover, in 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 222, entitled 
"Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism." Exec. Order No. 222, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 
2001). The Executive Order authorizes military tribunal prosecution of 
certain enemy combatant war criminals. Id. §§ l(e), 2(a). The relative 
merits of military tribunal and courts-martial prosecution are discussed at 
Part V below. 
45. Aldykiewicz & Corn, supra note 20, at 97 n.61 (emphasis added) (citing 
Military Justice Act of 1968, art. 18, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 1968 U.S.C.CAN. 
(82 Stat. 1335); see also 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2000). 
46. See Aldykiewicz & Corn, supra note 20, at 97-98. The War Crimes Act of 
1996 also gave federal courts jurisdiction over war crimes committed by or 
56 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 33 
B. Executive Recognition of the Legislative Grant of Jurisdiction 
While the legislatively-enacted UCMJ sets forth substantive law con-
cerning courts-martial, procedural rules for courts-martial are set 
forth in the Rules for Courts-Martia1.47 The Rules for Courts-Martial 
are promulgated by the President of the United States in his capacity 
as Commander-in-Chief, are reviewed annually by the Executive 
Branch, and are amended by Executive Order as deemed necessary.48 
The current edition of the Rules for Courts-Martial acknowledges that 
two types of war crime courts-martial jurisdiction exist in the UCMJ: 
the first type explicitly includes only servicemembers; and the second 
type includes any person, potentially including servicemembers, who 
commits a war crime.49 
The acknowledgment of two types of war crimes courts-martial juris-
diction is first evident in Rule for Courts-Martial 201 (f) (1) (B), which 
states that, in addition to the general courts-martial jurisdiction pro-
vided over "any person subject to the code," that "[g]eneral courts-
martial may try any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by 
military tribunal for any crime or offense against ... [t] he law of war 
.... "50 Additionally, in the discussion following Rule for Courts-Mar-
tial 307(c)(2), the drafters offer the following direction as to how to 
bring charges based on war crimes: "Ordinarily persons subject to the 
code [(distinguishing such persons from those not otherwise subject 
to the code)] should be charged with a specific violation of the code 
rather than a violation of the law of war."51 With this language, the 
Rules for Courts-Martial implicitly recognize that Article IS's jurisdic-
tion encompasses two types of war crimes defendants: "persons subject 
to this chapter for any offense made punishable by this chapter"52 and 
"any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribu-
nal .... "53 
against U.S. nationals or members of the U.S. armed forces. See War 
Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000). The legislative history of that 
bill indicates that some members of Congress mistakenly believed, contrary 
to the plain language of Article 18, that courts-martial jurisdiction could 
not reach beyond members of the U.S. armed forces, persons serving with 
the armed forces in the field, and enemy prisoners of war. See Aldykiewicz 
& Corn, supra note 20, at 144-50 (discussing the relationship between The 
War Crimes Act of 1996 and Article 18); see also id. at 80 n.9 (citing H.R. 
REp. No. 104-698, at 5 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2166, 2170 
(noting that "during the War Crimes Act debate, the viability of CQurt-mar-
tialing non-U.S. servicemembers for war crimes" was discussed and deter-
mined not to be a "viable option")). 
47. See R.C.M. 101 (a) (2000). 
48. See 1 FRANCIS A. GILLIGAN & FREDRIC I. LEDERER, COURT-MARTIAL PROCE-
DURE § 1-54.00 (2d ed. 1999). 
49. R.C.M. 201(f) (l)(A), (B). 
50. [d. at 201(f) (l)(B). 
51. [d. at 307(c) (2) discussion. 
52. 10 U.S.C. § 818 (2000). 
53. [d. 
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In sum, a new statute is not needed to invoke courts-martial jurisdic-
tion over foreign nationals, including enemy combatants, who commit 
war crimes. In addition, a new Executive Order from the President is 
not necessary to set forth the rules governing those courts-martial. 
Such jurisdiction already exists under Article 18 of the UCMJ, and the 
applicable procedures are those already used during courts-martial of 
our own servicemembers. Courts-martial is a legislatively-sanctioned, 
immediately-available forum for prosecuting war crimes committed 
against American prisoners and troops in Iraq. 
II. ENEMY OFFENSES CONSTITUTING VIOLATIONS OF THE 
LAW OF WAR 
The Geneva Conventions of 1949, the two Additional Protocols to 
the Geneva Conventions, and international treaties generally com-
prise the law of war or the law of armed conflict. 54 Because I advocate 
American courts-martial only for enemy war crimes committed against 
American prisoners and soldiers, the focus can be narrowed to the 
specific laws of war applicable to these alleged types of offenses. In 
November of 1992, the Department of Defense Office of General 
Counsel prepared a classified report for the Judge Advocate General 
of the Army specifically identifying substantiated instances of war 
crimes committed by Iraqi military forces during and preceding the 
1991 Persian Gulf War.55 That report identified violations of the Ge-
neva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims of August 12, 
1949,56 to which Iraq is a party, and of Hague Conventions IV and VIII 
of 1907,57 to which Iraq is not a party. 58 The report ultimately con-
54. See Center for Defense Information, Iraq: Questions Regarding the Laws oj 
War, at http://www.cdi.org/iraq/lawsofwar-pr.cfm (last visited Mar. 18, 
2003). 
55. See SUMMARY OF REpORT ON IRAQI WAR CRIMES, supra note 6. 
56. See id. at 11-13. The Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims 
of August 12,1949, are comprised of the following: (1) Geneva Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12,1949,6 V.S.T. 3114, 75 V.N.T.S. 31 [hereinaf-
ter First Geneva Convention]; (2) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 V.S.T. 3217, 75 V.N.T.S. 85; (3) 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 V.S.T. 3316, 75 V.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Conven-
tion]; (4) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 V.S.T. 3516, 75 V.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter 
Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
57. See SUMMARY OF REpORT ON IRAQI WAR CRIMES, supra note 6, at 11-13. See 
also Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and 
its annex: Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 461, available at http:/ / 
wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1907c.htm [hereinafter Hague IV]; 
Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact 
Mines, Oct. 18, 1907, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 580, available at 
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1907g.htm. 
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eluded that "Iraqi violations of the law of war were widespread and 
premeditated."59 
Based on written and videotaped witness accounts and photo-
graphs, videotapes, and other documentary evidence, sixteen specific 
categories of war crimes were found to have been committed by Iraq 
during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 60 Two of those categories concern 
war crimes committed against American prisoners, soldiers, and civil-
ians.61 Given the early reports of potentially analogous offenses com-
mitted during the recent conflict, those types of war crimes serve as 
particularly relevant examples here.62 These two categories of crimes 
are: (1) torture and other "inhumane" treatment of prisoners of war, 
in violation of the Third Geneva Convention;63 and (2) the use of 
subterfuge through civilian human shields in violation of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention.64 
58. Though Iraq is not a party to the 1907 Hague Conventions, the Judge Advo-
cate General has concluded, at least with regard to offenses committed dur-
ing the 1991 Persian Gulf War, that Iraqi citizens are bound by their 
provisions and subject to prosecution for violations of the law of war as 
therein set forth because those conventions have become a part of custom-
ary international law. See Summary of Report on Iraqi War Crimes, supra 
note 6, at 2. 
59. [d. at 11. 
60. See id. at 8, 11-13. 
61. See id. at 11-12. 
62. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
63. SUMMARY OF REpORT ON IRAQI WAR CRIMES, supra note 6, at 12 (identifying 
such war crimes as violations of Articles 13, 17, 22, 25, 26, 27, and 130 of the 
Third Geneva Convention). Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention 
mandates that prisoners of war "at all times be humanely treated." Third 
Geneva Convention, supra note 56, art. 13, 6 V.S.T. at 3328, 75 V.N.T.S. at 
146. Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention provides, among other 
things, that "[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coer-
cion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information 
of any kind whatever." [d. art. 17, 6 V.S.T. at 3332, 75 V.N.T.S. at 150. 
Article 22 of the Third Geneva Convention requires that prisoners of war 
be interned only in healthy and hygenic areas. [d. art. 22,6 V.S.T. at 3336, 
75 V.N.T.S. at 154. Article 25 of the Third Geneva Convention similarly 
requires, among other things, that prisoners of war be housed in warm, dry 
quarters with adequate light. [d. art. 25, 6 V.S.T. at 3338, 75 V.N.T.S. at 
156. Article 26 of the Third Geneva Convention requires that prisoners of 
war be given decent, nutritious food and clean water. [d. art. 26,6 V.S.T. at 
3340, 75 V.N.T.S. at 158. Article 27 of the Third Geneva Convention re-
quires that prisoners of war be provided with adequate, climate-appropriate 
clothing. [d. art. 27, 6 V.S.T. at 3340, 75 V.N.T.S. at 158. Finally, Article 
130 of the Third Geneva Convention describes "wilful [sic] killing, torture 
[or] inhuman treatment" of prisoners of war as "grave breaches" of the 
Convention. [d. art 130, 6 V.S.T. at 3420, 75 V.N.T.S. at 288. 
64. SUMMARY OF REpORT ON IRAQI WAR CRIMES, supra note 6, at 12 (identifying 
such war crimes as violations of Articles 28 and 38 (4) of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention). Article 28 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that 
"[t]he presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain 
points or areas immune from military operations." Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 56, art. 28, 6 V.S.T. at 3538, 75 V.N.T.S. at 308. Article 
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Media reports from the recent conflict suggest that Iraqis may have 
violated other treaties as well.65 For instance, Article 23 of Hague 
Convention IV prohibits killing or wounding the enemy "treacher-
ously," improperly using a flag of truce, and killing an enemy soldier 
who has surrendered.66 Fighting in civilian clothes to feign non-com-
batant status and feigning surrender would constitute violations of the 
first 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention ("Protocol 
1").67 Lastly, fighting from hospital zones violates the First Geneva 
Convention,68 and using mosques as fortresses violates Article 53 of 
Protocol I and the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cul-






38( 4) of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides that" [i]f [protected per-
sons] reside in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war, they shall 
be authorised [sic] to move from that area to the same extent as the nation-
als of the State concerned." [d. art. 38(4), 6 V.S.T. at 3542, 75 V.N.T.S. at 
312. 
See, e.g., supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
Hague IV, supra note 57, art. 23, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) at xx. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
lating to the Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts,june 8, 
1977, art. 37,1125 V.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. Article 37 of Proto-
col I generally prohibits killing, injuring or capturing an adversary by "re-
sort to perfidy.' [d. art. 37(1), 1125 V.N.T.S. at 21. It defines perfidy as 
"[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that 
he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of inter-
national law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confi-
dence" and gives four examples of perfidy: 
(A) The feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or 
of a surrender; (B) The feigning of an incapacitation by wounds or 
sickness; (C) The feigning of civilian, non-combatant status; and 
(D) The feigning of protected status by the use of signs, emblems 
or uniforms of the Vnited Nations or of neutral or other States not 
Parties to the conflict. 
[d. Some may be inclined to argue that the Iraqi tactics are mere "ruses of 
war" necessary to engage a superior foe. Article 37 clarifies that "[r]uses of 
war are not prohibited," and defines "ruses" as "acts which are intended to 
mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly but which infringe 
no rule of international law applicable in armed conflict and which are not 
perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary with 
respect to protection under that law." [d. art. 37(2), 1125 V.N.T.S. at 21-22. 
It lists the following examples: "the use of camouflage, decoys, mock opera-
tions and misinformation." [d. art. 37(2), 1125 V.N.T.S. at 22. Clearly, 
white flags and civilian clothes are examples of perfidy, not ruses. Though 
neither Iraq nor the Vnited States has signed Protocol I, its provisions are 
generally recognized as customary international law and therefore are bind-
ing even on states that are not parties to it. 
First Geneva Convention, supra note 56, art. 19, 6 V.S.T. at 3128, 75 
V.N.T.S. at 44 (providing that medical units and establishments "may in no 
circumstances be attacked, but shall at all times be respected and protected 
by the Parties to the conflict"). 
Protocol I, supra note 67, art. 53, 1125 V.N.T.S. at 27 (prohibiting the com-
mission of acts of hostility against "places of worship"); Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 
1954, arts. 1,2,249 V.N.T.S. 215,242 [hereinafter the 1954 Hague Conven-
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ularly where they appear to have been executed as a matter of policy 
and strategy, are of the type that I propose be adjudicated in the first 
phase of post-conflict accountability by American-convened courts-
martial. 
Additional war crimes identified in the 1992 report may also prove 
to be analogous to offenses committed in the recent conflict. Such 
war crimes include compelling foreign nationals to serve in the Iraqi 
armed forces in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, and indis-
criminate missile attacks and unnecessary destruction in violation of 
Hague IV. 70 Those crimes, however, are examples of the types ap-
propropriate for adjudication during what I have characterized as the 
second phase of war crimes accountability, consisting of Iraqi-con-
vened forums. 71 
As summarized in the Introduction, various media reports give 
strong indication that war crimes were committed by Iraqis against 
American soldiers during the recent war.72 At this writing, official in-
vestigations into those incidents are underway.73 Assuming substanti-
ating evidence is ultimately uncovered, and having established in Part 
II that courts-martial is an available forum, the following sections set 
forth why courts-martial prosecution is an appropriate and advanta-
geous first forum for prosecution of those war crimes. 
IV. JUDICIAL CURTAILMENT OF COURTS-MARTIAL JURISDIC-
TION HAS NOT LIMITED ARTICLE 18 JURISDICTION 
Though, as described in Part II, Congress clearly intended for the 
UCMJ to cover enemy war criminals, it must briefly be acknowledged 
that the original jurisdictional reach of the UCMJ has been judicially 
curtailed in several significant ways. These limitations on courts-mar-
tial jurisdiction have created the widespread misperception that 
courts-martial cannot try anyone but servicemembers.74 Over the last 
fifty years, in three main respects, courts have rejected language in the 
UCMJ that evidenced a Congressional intent to subject persons other 
tion] (providing that "cultural property" covered by the Convention in-
cludes religious buildings and monuments and mandating the 
"safeguarding of and respect for" such property). 
70. See SUMMARY OF REpORT ON IRAQI WAR CRIMES, supra note 6, at 12. 
7l. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. Other treaties to which Iraq is a 
party might also serve as a basis for locally-convened war crimes prosecu-
tions during this second phase. Such treaties include: the Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Vse in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, 
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925,26 V.S.T. 571,14 
I.L.M. 49; and the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 V.N.T.S. 215. 
72. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text. 
73. See Lewis, supra note 15. 
74. See, e.g., supra note 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative 
history of the War Crimes Act of 1996). 
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than active duty American military members to trial by courts-
martia1.75 
The first example of judicial reluctance to let Congress extend 
courts-martial jurisdiction beyond American servicemembers con-
cerns Article 2(11) of the UCM]. Article 2(11) was amended in 1956 
by Congress specifically to subject "persons serving with, employed by, 
or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States" to 
courts-martialjurisdiction.76 In 1957, and again in 1960, the U.S. Su-
preme Court declared such jurisdiction unconstitutional as applied to 
civilian dependents and employees.77 In Reid v. Covert, by a 6-3 vote, 
the Supreme Court reversed the courts-martial murder convictions of 
two dependent wives who had each been separately convicted of mur-
dering their servicemember husbands, one while stationed in En-
gland, and one while stationed in Japan. 78 The Court held that 
civilian dependents of members of the armed forces overseas could 
not constitutionally be tried by a court-martial in times of peace for 
capital offenses committed abroad.79 Then, in Kinsella v. U.S. ex rel. 
Singleton, by a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court held that the courts-martial 
involuntary manslaughter conviction of a dependent wife was also un-
constitutional, finding any distinction between capital and non-capital 
offenses to be constitutionally insignificant.8o The Court reached the 
same decision in another 1960 case, McElroy v. U.S. ex rel. Guagliardo, 







See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (invalidating the extension of 
Article 2(11) of the UCMJ); U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) 
(invalidating portions of Article 3(a) of the UCMJ); Latney v. Ignatius, 416 
F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (questioning Article 2(10) of the UCMJ). 
10 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1958). 
See Kinsella v. U.S. ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); McElroy v. U.S. ex 
rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
354 U.S. at 3-4, 41, 65. 
Id. at 5. 
361 U.S. at 235-36, 248-49. Though court-martial prosecution of civilian 
dependents has been invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court, military com-
mission prosecution of civilian dependents during times of military govern-
ment jurisdiction overseas has been upheld. In Madsen v. Kinsella, a case 
that preceded Reid v. Covert, the Court recognized that the United States 
Court of the Allied High Commission, established in the American Zone in 
Occupied Germany, had the constitutional authority under military govern-
mentjurisdiction to try civilian Yvette Madsen for the murder of her active 
duty husband. 343 U.S. 341, 342-43 (1952). While denying Madsen's 
habeas petition, the Court observed: 
[A]s Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, [the President] may, in time of war, establish and prescribe 
the jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions, and of 
tribunals in the nature of such commissions, in territory occupied 
by Armed Forces of the United States. His authority to do this 
sometimes survives cessation of hostilities. 
Id. at 348, 362. Madsen was charged under the German Criminal Code and 
was committed to the Federal Reformatory for Women in Alderson, West 
Virginia. Id. at 344-45. 
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ployees.81 In McElroy, the Court, by a 5-4 vote, reversed the courts-
martial convictions of a civilian Air Force employee in Morocco and a 
civilian Army employee in Germany, finding the convictions to be un-
constitutional extensions of military jurisdiction over U.S. citizens.82 
Another Congressional extension of courts-martial jurisdiction was 
invalidated in 1955.83 Article 3(a) of the UCMJ provides that court-
martial jurisdiction is retained when a servicemember commits a 
crime on active duty but separates from the service before court-mar-
tial proceedings commence.84 That type of jurisdiction was declared 
unconstitutional in Toth v. Quarles.85 The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 
decision, invalidated the' court-martial of Robert Toth, a former ser-
vicemember convicted of committing a murder in Korea while on ac-
tive duty with the Air Force.86 Notably, the Toth Court opined that 
Congress could have constitutionally created such jurisdiction, but 
had not done SO.87 
The final way that courts have limited Congress's attempts to extend 
the reach of courts-martial jurisdiction beyond active duty ser-
vicemembers concerns Article 2(a)(1O) of the UCMJ. Article 2(a)(10) 
provides that "[iJn time of war, persons serving with or accompanying 
an armed force in the field" are subject to courts-martial jurisdic-
tion.88 This provision has not been reviewed by the Supreme Court, 
but it was rejected during the Vietnam War by a federal appellate 
court in Latney v. Ignatius.89 The Latney court found Article 2(a)(10) 
courts-martial jurisdiction to be unconstitutional, at least as applied to 
a civilian seaman serving under time charter to the Navy.90 
In sum, despite contrary Congressional intent, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has taken the position that a court-martial may not try a U.S. 
citizen unless that citizen was in the U.S. armed forces at the time of 
the crime and at the time of the tria1.91 Some commentators may be 
tempted to broadly suggest that this indicates a judicial intent to per-
mit courts-martial only against active duty servicemembers. But the 
judicial curtailment of UCMJ jurisdiction described above has only 
limited when courts-martial may be convened to try American citizens. 
Other well-known domestic92 and international93 precedents clearly 
81. 361 U.S. 281 (1960). 
82. Id. at 282-83, 287. 
83. U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 11 (1955). 
84. See 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (2000). 
85. 350 U.S. at 23. 
86. Id. at 13, 23. 
87. Id. at 21 ("If Congress had included this jurisdiction, it would be proper."). 
88. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a) (10). 
89. 416 F.2d 821, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
90. Id. 
91. See supra notes 74-90 and accompanying text. 
92. For a history of early American military commissions and courts, see Major 
Timothy C. MacDonnell, Military Commissions and Courts-Martial: A Brief Dis-
cussion of the Constitutional and jurisdictional Distinctions Between the Two 
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support the jurisdiction of military courts over enemy war crimes. 
Thus, despite some judicially-imposed limitations on Congress's in-
tent, courts-martial remain an entirely viable forum for prosecution of 
war crimes committed by foreign nationals. The following discussion 
sets forth why courts-martial are a particularly appropriate forum for 
war crimes recently committed against Americans in Iraq. 
v. FOR PROSECUTION OF IRAQI WAR CRIMES AGAINST AMER-
ICAN PRISONERS AND SOLDIERS, REGULAR MILITARY 
COURTS-MARTIAL ARE A PREFERABLE OPTION TO SPE-
CIALLY-CONVENED MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
The Bush administration has pointedly reserved military commis-
sions as one option for prosecution of enemy combatant war 
criminals.94 Although it has been described by the Administration as 
a tool to be used against "foreign enemy war criminals,"95 the lan-
guage of President Bush's November 13, 2001 Military Order autho-
rizes military commission prosecutions only of members of AI Qaeda, 
international terrorists, and those who harbor them.96 It has been re-
ported that we may pursue justice against Iraqi war criminals via an 
amendment to that order, or through an entirely new order establish-
ing similar military commissions for war crimes committed in Iraq.97 
Courts, 2002 ARMY LAw 19 (2002), and Major Michael O. Lacey, Military 
Commissions: A Historical Survey, 2002 ARMY LAw 41 (2002). Virtually every 
American armed conflict since the American Revolution has seen military 
jurisdiction prosecution of war crimes. See Lacey, supra, at 4l. 
93. Military trials of war criminals are hardly unique to the American military 
justice system. In the aftermath of WWII, for example, over two thousand 
war crimes trials were conducted by ten different countries. SeejoNEs, supra 
note 19, at 168. 
94. Alberto R. Gonzales, Editorial, Martialjustice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
30, 2001, at A27. 
95. According to White House counsel Alberto R. Gonzales, the military com-
missions authorized in the President's Nov. 13, 2001 Military Order would 
be applied only to "foreign enemy war criminals." [d. 
96. Exec. Order No. 222, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 13, 2001). Presi-
dent Bush's November 13, 2001 Military Order sets forth three categories 
of individuals to be potentially tried by military commission: (1) anyone 
whom the President finds reason to believe is or was a member of Al Qaeda; 
(2) anyone whom the President finds reason to believe "has engaged in, 
aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, 
or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten to cause, or have 
as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United States, its 
citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy"; or, (3) anyone 
whom the President finds reason to believe "has knowingly harbored one 
or more individuals" described in the first two categories. [d. Though 
much criticism has been levied against the Order's use of the word "har-
bored," one cannot resist noting that this language practically mirrors the 
language used in Article 27 of the original 1775 Articles of War. See supra 
notes 26-29 and accompanying text (discussing the language of Article 27). 
97. Neal A. Lewis, Tribunals Nearly Ready for Afghanistan Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 8, 2003, at Bll. 
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The November 13, 2001 Military Order itself prompted an immediate 
flurry of domestic and international criticism, from legal scholars, po-
litical pundits, and moral philosophers.98 A brief review of the main 
criticisms levied against military commissions demonstrates why court-
martial is a preferable forum for prosecution of enemy war criminals. 
The most resonant criticisms of the President's Order establishing 
military commissions have been those directed towards its perceived 
procedural short-cuts-the authorization of prosecutions providing 
less due process than would be available to U.S. federal district court 
defendants.99 Typical of these criticisms is the expressed concern that 
the potential military commissions fall short of "the kind of funda-
mentally fair trial process that America has held up to the world as the 
standard for criminal adjudications."lOo Indeed, the American Bar As-
sociation ("ABA") commissioned a task force to address whether the 
commissions would fall short of "recognized standards of American 
]ustice."lOl 
The initial criticisms of the proposed commissions cited the follow-
ing specific procedural shortcomings: the absence of some form of 
grandjury-like presentment; the possibility of closed, rather than 
open trials; the absence of the opportunity for the accused to retain 
counsel of his choice; the possibility that the death penalty could be 
handed down by a non-unanimous verdict; and the absence of full 
appellate rights, including the opportunity to petition the U.S. Su-
preme Court for a writ of certiorari.102 Many, but not all, of these 
98. See Michael J. Kelly, Essay: Understanding September 11 th-An International Le-
gal Perspective on the War in Afghanistan, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 283 (criticiz-
ing Executive Order No. 222 as "illegal"); Letter from William A. Courson, 
Executive Director of the Magnus Hirschfeld Centre for Human Rights, to 
Members of the New Jersey Delegation of the United States Senate and the 
United States House of Representatives, (Dec. 1,2001), available at http:// 
legalminds.lp.findlaw.com/list/ queerlaw-edit/ msg03 736.html (describing 
the Order as yet another "blow against the Constitution" and accusing the 
President of "bypass ring] fundamental principles of justice"). 
99. See Kelly, supra note 98, at 290 (stating that the Order "breaches other pro-
tections by eliminating the right to appeal, not ensuring an independent 
and impartial court, and not providing for private conferral with counsel"). 
Many commentators also attacked the potential commissions as unconstitu-
tional, and lacking a proper jurisdictional predicate. See, e.g., Neil K. Katya 
& Lawrence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribu-
nals, 111 YALE LJ. 1259, 1259-60 (2002). Thosejurisdiction-based, absence-
of-proper-Iegislative-mandate criticisms are unlikely to carry over to military 
trials of war crimes committed by soldiers and government officials during 
the recent war in Iraq and thus are not summarized here. 
100. ]. Gordon Forester,Jr., & Kevin]. Barry, Military Commissions: Meeting Ameri-
can Standards of justice, 49 FED. LAw. 28, 29 (2002). 
101. REpORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MILITARY COMMISSIONS, 2002 A.B.A. 
TASK FORCE ON TERRORlSM AND THE LAw I,JAN. 4, 2002, available at http:/ / 
www.abanet.org/leadership/military.pdf. 
102. Id. at 16-17 (recommending that procedures for military commissions con-
vened under the authority of the President's Order provide for prompt no-
tice of charges, proceedings open to the press and public, the opportunity 
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concerns are addressed and effectively mooted by the Department of 
Defense ("DOD") regulations promulgating procedures for the com-
missions. 103 The drafters of the DOD regulations on military commis-
sions do seem to have taken many of the criticisms, and especially the 
recommendations of the ABA, to heart. lo4 
But not all commentators are satisfied with the procedures set forth 
in the DOD regulations. Continuing criticisms include: (1) denial of 
the right to trial before a "regularly-constituted" tribunal; (2) lack of 
review of commission proceedings by an independent, impartial 
court-military commissions would be reviewed only by the Secretary 
of Defense or President; (3) denial of the "full federal or military rules 
of evidence"-the DOD rules permit some hearsay evidence and un-
sworn written statements and otherwise relax the rules of evidence; 
and (4) lack of judicial review of detention.105 We can reasonably ex-
pect that both American and international observers will continue to 
voice such criticisms if tribunals are convened. 
By comparison, courts-martial is a forum that: (1) is regularly-consti-
tuted;I06 (2) is appealable to the U.S. Supreme Court;107 (3) is gov-
erned by the Military Rules of Evidence, which largely mirror the 
Federal Rules of Evidence;lo8 and (4) provides for pretrial confine-
ment reviewlo9 and prohibits charge less indefinite detentions.110 
Thus, following established courts-martial procedures, rather than 
those authorized by the DOD regulations, would avert many, if not all, 
of the due-process-based criticisms levied against military commis-
for defendants to choose their own counsel, the right to review of convic-
tion and sentence by a higher tribunal, and a prohibition of the death pen-
alty on less than a unanimous vote of all members of the commission). 
103. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER No.1, PROCE-
DURES FOR TRIALS BY MILITARY COMMISSION OF CERTAIN NON-UNITED STATES 
CITIZENS IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http:/ 
/www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/ d20020321 ord. pdf. 
104. See id. (providing the accused with the opportunity to choose his or her 
own military or civilian counsel under certain circumstances, and providing 
that proceedings should be open "to the maximum extent practicable"). 
105. Jordan]. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of 
Procedure, 23 MICH.]. INT'L L. 677, 678-89 (2002). Paust notes that the "im-
proprieties" in Military Commission Order No. 1 miITor the improprieties 
concerning the Peruvian military commissions addressed by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. Id. at 678 (citingJordanJ. Paust, Antiter-
rorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH.]. INT'L L. 1, at 10 & 
n.20 (2001». 
106. See RC.M. 501 (a) (2000) (governing courts-martial composition). 
107. See RC.M. 1205 (permitting review of courts-martial decisions by the Su-
preme Court). 
108. Gregory P. Noone, Essay: President Bush's Military Order: Detention, Treatment 
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 34 CAsE W. REs. 
]. INT'L L. 253, 255 (2002). 
109. See RC.M. 305(i). 
110. See RC.M. 308(a) (requiring that the accused be notified of the charges 
against him as soon as possible). 
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sions. lll In one sense, convening courts-martial to try enemy war 
criminals is virtually immune from criticism-if court-martial offers 
sufficient due process for the men and women serving in the Ameri-
can armed forces, critics will be hard-pressed to argue that others are 
somehow due more. Court-martial prosecution has the appealing 
symmetry of offering exactly the same procedural safeguards to those 
captured by the American military and charged with crimes as would 
be applied to an American soldier who commits a crime in the process 
of that capture. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I do not expect American courts-martial convened for enemy war 
crimes to be embraced by every critic. They will not provide a com-
plete retributive panacea or a perfect path to reconciliation. I only 
propose that we give consideration to courts-martial as a third possible 
option for addressing crimes committed against our soldiers during 
armed conflict, given that our current consideration seems limited to 
either (1) inaction and acquiescence, or (2) military commissions. 
Even the most stalwart critics of military justice forums must concede 
that the Geneva Conventions give us the right to try enemy prisoners 
who have committed war crimes against our soldiers,112 and that 
courts-martial prosecutions satisfy international norms regarding the 
rights to be afforded even unprivileged combatants in criminal pro-
ceedingsy3 Moreover, the two-phased approach to post-conflict jus-
tice that I have advocated may help legitimize the actions of the 
fledgling government by establishing some clear separation between 
American and Iraqi war crimes forums. 
In April 2003, the world watched as American Marines and Iraqi 
civilians in Bagdhad's Firdos Square pulled down a 40-foot bronze 
statute of Saddam Hussein. In subsequent years, when it comes time 
to prosecute war crimes committed against American prisoners and 
American soldiers in Iraq, the world will be watching just as intently. 
We must decide, and soon, exactly what precedent American military 
justice will set. If post-war Iraq is to accomplish the transition from 
oppression to a free and just society, redress for war crimes committed 
against American prisoners and soldiers is only the first phase of ac-
countability. Other forums must certainly follow the initial prosecu-
tions; forums such as Iraqi tribunals to adjudicate crimes committed 
111. Some critics of the tribunals have conceded as much. See, e.g., Forester & 
Barry, supra note 100, at 28 ("If they are to be fundamentally fair, military 
commissions must follow court-martial procedures and be subject to some 
sort of meaningful judicial review."). 
112. See supra notes 56-64, 68 and accompanying text (describing violations of 
the Geneva Conventions committed by Iraqis during both the 1991 Persian 
Gulf War and the recent conflict in Iraq). 
113. See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 67, art. 75, 1125 V.N.T.S. at 52. 
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by Hussein's regime against the Iraqi populace,114 and possibly even 
Kuwaiti courts seeking accountability from Iraqi regime officials ac-
cused of war crimes from the last decade. America has the opportu-
nity, through its system of military justice, to set an example of 
immediate and just redress. If one is not set, history suggests that fu-
ture Iraqi or Kuwaiti forums will be no more than kangaroo courts 
susceptible to the "victors' vengeance" criticismYs Having committed 
troops to armed conflict abroad, America also has the moral obliga-
tion to ensure that crimes of perfidy and other violations of the law of 
war do not continue to go unpunished and thereby become the de 
facto means of defense against an asymmetric force. 
Crimes were unquestionably committed against Americans during 
the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 116 The international norms and rules of 
armed conflict appear to have been openly flouted by Iraqi forces dur-
ing the recent war as well. The first forum convened to try those 
crimes must provide expedient but judicious resolutions. It should 
also be a forum that can effectively set a due process benchmark for 





For post-conflict societies trying to shift from tyranny to democracy, the 
main routes to this "transitional justice" have historically been criminal 
prosecution or grants of amnesty. For a thorough review of the advantages 
and disadvantages of retributive justice during societal transition, see Erin 
Daly, Transformativejustice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT'L LEGAL 
PERSP. 73, 74-76 (2002) (noting that the new government's response to past 
abuses is an important opportunity to accomplish some transformation of 
the culture and arguing that neither prosecution nor amnesty adequately 
serves the goal of transformation). Other scholars have argued, pointing to 
the examples of South Mrica's TRC and Rwanda'a gacaca tribunals, that in 
many cases reconciliation may simply be a more important societal goal 
than the retribution offered by criminal adjudication. See Bert van 
Roermund, Rubbing Off and Rubbing On: The Grammar of Reconciliation, in 
LETHE'S LAw: JUSTICE, LAw, AND ETHICS IN RECONCILIATION (Emilios Chris-
todoloudidis & Scott Veitch eds., Hart Publishing 2001) at 180 (describing 
reconciliation as the situation where victims "defer the right to retribution 
to the extent that retribution would obstruct peace"). 
Iraq's U.S.-appointed Governing Council announced on October 2, 2003, 
that it was preparing a "domestic war crimes tribunal" to "try members of 
Saddam Hussein's government and Hussein himself should he be cap-
tured." Karl Vick, Iraqi War Crimes Tribunal Proposed; 2 More US. Soldiers 
Killed in Attacks, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 2003, at A14 (noting that "[s]uch a 
course would defy the recommendation of international legal experts who 
have warned that an Iraqi court would generate suspicions of "Victor's jus-
tice," or manipulation by the American authorities who retain ultimate 
power in Iraq"). 
See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 55-64 and 
accompanying text. 
